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Policymakers often want to achieve low inflation to avoid the low economic 
growth associated with high inflation. Reducing inflation through monetary 
policy (disinflation) is not costless as it can coincide with higher 
unemployment rates and reduced output. In this paper we use sacrifice ratios 
to calculate the cost of disinflation during the 1990s for 40 countries. We 
then study whether transparency and democratic accountability of monetary 
institutions reduces disinflation costs. Our empirical results suggest that 
more transparent central banks seem to face higher disinflation costs. This 
result could be because more transparent central banks have lower initial 
inflation rates during their disinflation episodes. Therefore, reducing 
inflation even further is more costly to them. We find no significant 
relationship between independence of central banks and the disinflation 
costs they faced during 1990s.  
JEL Codes: E58; H11 
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The Effect of Transparency, Independence and Accountability 





Central banks have private information about economic conditions but they have 
incomplete control of macroeconomics outcomes. These two elements create moral hazard 
as central banks can easily blame unexpected economic shocks for any unforeseeable 
increase in the inflation rate. Transparency can reduce those risks as it makes central banks 
accountable to elected politicians (Stasavage, 2003). Transparency itself can result in lower 
inflation as well as lower output costs of disinflation (Chortareas et al., 2002b; 2003). 
Transparency, however, is related to independence. Some studies argue that 
independent central banks can achieve lower inflation rates with no costs to their real 
economies. Alesina and Summers (1993), for example, find that while central bank 
independence aids price stability there is no correlation between growth, unemployment 
and real interest rates. Other scholars argue that if central banks are not held accountable 
for their actions they might become too conservative and focused on lowering inflation at 
the expense of output or unemployment. Debelle and Fischer (1995), for example, conclude 
that if central banks are not held accountable for their actions there is a good chance that 
they might become too conservative. Ultimately, this is an empirical question related to the 
effect of central bank transparency and independence on the costs of disinflation.   
In this paper, we empirically study whether central bank transparency and 
independence reduces disinflation costs. We start by using sacrifice ratios to calculate the 
cost of disinflation during the 1990s for 40 countries. Our empirical results suggest that 
central banks that are more transparent have higher disinflation costs. This result could be 
because central banks that are more transparent have lower initial inflation rates during 
their disinflation episodes. Therefore, reducing inflation even further is more costly to 
them. We find no significant relationship between independence of central banks and 
disinflation costs during our period of analysis. 
 
 
A Transparency Model 
 
This section presents the model used by Stasavage (2003) to clarify how central bank 
transparency can lower disinflation costs. In this model the policymaker’s loss function is 






𝒃𝒃�𝒚𝒚 − (𝒚𝒚∗ + 𝒌𝒌)�
𝟐𝟐
                                                                                                (1) 
where 𝑏𝑏 is a positive constant that shows the weight placed on stabilizing output relative 
to stabilizing inflation. The inflation target (preferred rate of inflation) is normalized to 
 3 
zero and preferred output is 𝑦𝑦∗ + 𝑘𝑘 , where 𝑦𝑦∗  is potential output and 𝑘𝑘  is a positive 
constant. 
 
The standard expectations-augmented supply curve for the economy can be explained 
as follows:  
 
𝒚𝒚 = 𝒚𝒚∗ + 𝝅𝝅 − 𝝅𝝅𝒆𝒆                                                                                                                              (2) 
 
where output depends on potential output and the difference between actual inflation 𝜋𝜋 and 
expected inflation 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 . 
Finally, the actual inflation rate depends on rate of money growth chosen by the 
policymaker (𝑚𝑚) and an exogenous shock to money demand (𝑣𝑣) as the following equation 
shows: 
 
𝝅𝝅 = 𝒎𝒎 + 𝒗𝒗                                                                                                                                        (3) 
 
The shock can be decomposed into a forecastable component 𝑓𝑓  and an unforecastable 
component 𝑒𝑒 (equation 4).  
 
𝒗𝒗 = 𝒇𝒇 + 𝒆𝒆                                                                                                                                           (4) 
 
Following Stasavage (2003), we assume 𝑓𝑓 and 𝑒𝑒 are normally distributed, uncorrelated and 
have mean zero. 
In order to find the equilibrium outcome of a one-shot version of this monetary policy 
game we first set up the following sequence of moves: 
 
1. The public fixes expected inflation 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 . 
2. The policymaker produces a forecast 𝑓𝑓  of the money demand shock 𝑣𝑣 . If the 
policymaker is transparent, they reveal this forecast to the public. 
3. The policymaker chooses the rate of money growth 𝑚𝑚. 
4. The money demand shock 𝑣𝑣 is realized. 
In a one-shot game it does not make a difference whether the policymaker reveals their 
forecast or not, mainly because the public has already picked its expected inflation in stage 
one. In a repeated version of the game, however, forecast publication plays an important 
role. In one-shot game once the public fixes its expectation, the policymaker has an 
incentive to choose a positive inflation rate in order to achieve output above its potential 
level. The problem arises because the public will be expecting that move. Therefore, the 
average equilibrium rate of inflation will be 𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘, and the average equilibrium rate of output 
will be 𝑦𝑦∗ (given that 𝑓𝑓 and 𝑒𝑒 are mean zero). 
One way that politicians can commit to a lower rate of inflation is by delegating 
monetary policy to an independent central banker, who has a lower value of 𝑏𝑏 than the 
government. A second solution would be building reputation by committing to a lower 
inflation rate than 𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘. 
Transparency is relevant where we have a repeated game. When a new government is 
trying to build a reputation there is uncertainty about whether they are committed to a low 
inflation rate. In this case the public knows the policymaker’s loss function but they are 
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initially uncertain about whether the policymaker is committed to achieve a zero rate of 
inflation or whether they want to pursue the discretionary rate of inflation (𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘), the same 
as what they would do if it was a one-shot game. 
Following Stasavage (2003), we assume that the public starts with belief 𝑝𝑝, that the 
preferred inflation rate is zero, and belief (1 − 𝑝𝑝) that the preferred inflation rate is 𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘. 
Therefore, public expected inflation can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝝅𝝅𝒆𝒆 = 𝒑𝒑(𝟎𝟎) + (𝟏𝟏 − 𝒑𝒑)𝒃𝒃𝒌𝒌                                                                                                             (5) 
 
After observing inflation, the public will update its belief according to Bayes’ rule, as 




𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑�𝝅𝝅�𝝅𝝅� = 𝟎𝟎�+(𝟏𝟏−𝒑𝒑)𝐏𝐏𝐫𝐫�𝝅𝝅�𝝅𝝅� = 𝒃𝒃𝒌𝒌�                                                                                (6) 
 
where 𝜋𝜋�  represents the policymaker’s intended rate of inflation and 𝜋𝜋 represents the actual 
inflation outcome. When a policymaker is committed to 𝜋𝜋�  = 0 then p will converge to 1 
eventually. How fast the public updates its beliefs depends on how much information 
policymakers reveal. If all public members knew the policymaker’s exact forecast, then 
they would perfectly observe the intended rate of inflation. Then, after one period, they 
would update their belief to either 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1 = 1 or 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1 = 0.  
When the policymaker does not reveal all information, the public faces a more 
complicated problem. They update their belief by guessing whether the observed rate of 
inflation is drawn from a distribution with mean zero or whether it is drawn from a 
distribution with mean 𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘. The less information the public has the more it takes for them 
to update their initial belief. If we substitute equation 5 into equation 2 we will get equation 
7 as follows: 
 
𝒚𝒚 = 𝒚𝒚∗ − (𝟏𝟏 − 𝒑𝒑)𝒃𝒃𝒌𝒌+ 𝒆𝒆                                                                                                             (7) 
 
Equation (7) shows that if the policymaker is committed to achieving a zero inflation 
rate then at each period as p increases output will also increase. If transparency results in 
faster convergence to 𝑝𝑝 = 1 then this means that transparency will be associated with 
higher levels of output. When the policymaker is trying to reduce inflation (disinflation 
cases), the existence of transparency could reduce the costs of disinflation. 
 
 
Data and Calculation of Sacrifice Ratios 
 
There are various definitions of transparency and independence measures in the literature. 
For example, Stasavage (2003) considers a central bank transparent if it publicly publishes 
its economic forecasts and discusses past forecast errors. He constructs a forecast 
transparency index by using the information gathered from a central bank survey conducted 
by Fry et al. (2000). Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) introduced a more comprehensive 
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transparency index where they consider political, economic, procedural, policy and 
operational transparency. Each area focuses on different aspect of monetary policy. 
Political transparency concentrates on openness about policy objectives, while economic 
transparency denotes openness about economic information such as data, policy models, 
and internal forecasts used by the central bank. Procedural transparency focuses on the way 
monetary policy decisions are made. Policy transparency relates to the prompt 
announcement of policy decisions and the explanation of the decisions and their 
implications. Finally, operational transparency is about how open the implementation of 
the central bank’s decisions is to the public. Here we use Forecast Transparency created 
by Stasavage (2003) and Transparency Index by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). We refer 
readers to those papers for a full description of their construction. 
There are different levels of accountability that central bank officials face in different 
countries. Following Stasavage (2003), we use two dummy variables (Report to 
Legislature and Override Possibility) to capture those differences. Researchers have 
proposed various central bank independence indices (Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman et al., 
1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014). Here we use the 
Independence Index estimated by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). They calculate their 
index for a large and comprehensive set of countries from 1998 until 2010. They augment 
the criteria of Cukierman et al. (1992) and add measures of limits on the reappointment of 
the CEO, measures of provisions affecting (re)appointment of other board members like 
those affecting the CEO, restrictions on government representation on the board, and 
intervention of the government in exchange rate policy formulation.  
Researchers have studied the trade-off between inflation and output (or 
unemployment) using the Philips curve since the 1950s. Okun (1978) and Gordon and King 
(1982) used an augmented estimated Phillips curve to calculate the sacrifice ratio for the 
United States. Ball (1994) points out the shortcomings of their methods as they constrain 
the output-inflation trade-off the same during disinflation and during inflationary periods, 
or during temporary fluctuations in demand. Because of this shortcoming of the Phillips 
Curve approach, most researchers have used versions of Ball (1994)’s method. He 
proposed a new method in which he specifies disinflation periods and calculates sacrifice 
ratios associated with those episodes. To calculate sacrifice ratio from output gap we follow 
Ball (1994)’s method. He first defines disinflation episodes and finds out how inflation 
trend and output gap changed over that period. The sacrifice ratio is then calculated when 
the change in output gap is in the numerator and change in inflation is in the denominator.  
Anderson and Wascher (1999) calculate sacrifice ratios using both output and 
unemployment data. They conclude that sacrifice ratios calculated using unemployment 
data are different from those calculated using output data. We, therefore, calculate sacrifice 
ratio using unemployment data as well. Following Zhang (2005), we calculate the 
unemployment loss as the difference between the actual unemployment rate and the natural 
rate of unemployment during the disinflation episodes. The sacrifice ratio is then the 
unemployment loss over the change in inflation during the disinflation episode.  
We use percentage change of quarterly CPI (Consumer prices-All items) for 40 
countries from the OECD. We then identified disinflation periods following the method of 
Ball (1994). The inflation trend for each year is calculated as an average of the inflation 
rate for eight quarters (four quarters of that year and two quarters before and two quarter 
after that year). We then identified the peaks (troughs) when the trend inflation at period t 
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is higher (lower) than the trend inflation at period t-1 and t+1. The difference between 
peaks and troughs will give us the change in inflation for that episode. A disinflation 
episode is defined when the trend inflation falls at least 1.5 percentage points. Following 
Stasavage (2003), we consider the most recent disinflation episode in the 1990s. The only 
exceptions are when disinflation episodes run through 2000s (e.g. Mexico, Hungary, Chile) 
or when the data was only available for 2000s (e.g. Estonia). 
We use Real GDP (Constant 2005 US$) annual data from World Bank as actual output. 
Again, following the Ball (1994) method, we calculate the output gap as follows. First, we 
took the log of actual output and then assumed that output is at its potential when inflation 
is at its peak and one year after its trough. The output trend is the fitted line that connects 
these two points and output gap is the difference between the fitted line and log output. 
For Unemployment we use annual unemployment rate data from the OECD’s 
Economic Outlook. For countries with missing data we substituted data from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. The only exceptions were Poland and Slovenia 
where World Bank did not have unemployment data for the disinflation periods. For 
Poland, we took the average of their monthly unemployment rate data from the Central 
Statistical Office of Poland. For Slovenia, we were not able to find reliable data for 
unemployment at 1989 (the start of their disinflation episode) so there is no sacrifice ratio 
for Slovenia using the unemployment method. 
The sacrifice ratio for output gap is calculated as cumulative change in the output gap 
over the change in the inflation during the disinflation episode. The sacrifice ratio for 
unemployment is calculated using Zhang’s (2005) method. He made two assumptions about 
the natural rate of unemployment. First, he assumed that the unemployment rate is at the 
natural level at the start of a disinflation episode (inflation peak). Secondly, he assumed 
that the natural level of unemployment is constant through each disinflation episode. The 
difference between the actual unemployment rate and the natural rate of unemployment is 
the employment loss caused by the disinflationary episode. The sacrifice ratio is then the 
employment loss over the change in inflation during the disinflation episode. 
Initial inflation rate is the inflation rate at the peak of each disinflation episode. The 
speed of disinflation is the total change from peak to trough divided by the length of the 
episode. Openness is defined as imports divided by GDP. We use the ratio published by 
World Bank for each country and take the average of the data from 1990 until 2000.  
We calculate sacrifice ratios using both output gap and unemployment data. 
Disinflation episodes are identified based on the Ball (1994) method in both cases. For the 
output gap sacrifice ratio, we follow Ball (1994) for annual data and for unemployment we 
follow Zhang (2005). Table 1 shows the sacrifice ratios calculated using these two 
methods. 
Based on theory we expect disinflation to be costly in terms of output and 
unemployment. Our results confirm that for countries that have relatively low initial 
inflation rates. Countries with high initial inflation rates, however, seem to bear no cost or 
very little cost of disinflation. Hofstetter (2008) also found that during 1990s Latin 
American countries faced negative disinflation costs. He explained his puzzling results by 
various factors such as capital inflows to the region during 1990s, unique inflation history 
















Australia 1995-1998 3.1 3.7 0.2 -0.3 
Austria 1992-1998 3.0 3.8 1.6 0.9 
Belgium 1990-1995 1.6 3.4 0.7 3.5 
Brazil 1993-1998 2035.1 2038.8 -0.004 0.003 
Canada 1990-1994 4.2 5.3 1.4 2.5 
Chile 1990-2004 22.3 23.9 -1.5 0.3 
China 1994-1999 22.5 21.6 -0.3 0.1 
Czech Republic 1997-2000 6.2 9.7 0.4 1.6 
Denmark 1988-1993 2.9 4.4 1.5 4.1 
Estonia 2001-2003 3.3 5.2 -0.03 -1.5 
Finland 1989-1996 5.8 6.4 4.2 10.7 
France 1990-1994 1.6 3.3 0.8 3.8 
Germany 1992-1996 3.4 4.9 0.5 2.1 
Greece 1991-2000 16.7 19.7 1.1 1.1 
Hungary 1995-2003 20.3 25.6 0.5 -1.2 
Iceland 1988-1995 21.9 23.4 0.4 0.8 
India 1998-2000 6.8 9.9 -0.2 0.1 
Indonesia 1998-2000 36.3 41.8 0.03 0.04 
Ireland 1989-1993 1.7 3.6 -1.1 -2.3 
Israel 1994-2000 10.2 11.9 -0.5 0.1 
Italy 1995-1998 3.0 4.8 0.04 0.1 
Japan 1990-1995 3.1 3.1 0.04 0.7 
Korea 1997-2000 3.2 5.6 2.0 3.2 
Luxemburg 1992-1996 1.9 3.2 0.2 2.2 
Mexico 1996-2006 31.0 34.7 -0.2 -0.7 
Netherlands 1991-1996 1.3 3.2 3.1 4.3 
New Zealand 1995-1999 2.3 3.0 -0.1 0.9 
Norway 1987-1994 6.4 8.2 1.8 3.3 
Poland 1990-1999 401.7 410.3 0.1 0.2 
Portugal 1990-1999 10.8 13.2 1.2 0.7 
Russia 1993-1997 543.2 560.3 0.02 0.03 
Slovak Republic 1993-1997 10.9 17.2 -0.2 0.1 
Slovenia 1989-1999 1149.1 1156.2 0.04 - 
South Africa 1991-2000 10.0 15.1 1.1 -1.1 
Spain 1990-1998 4.7 6.7 2.6 6.8 
Sweden 1990-1998 9.3 9.5 2.2 6.3 
Switzerland 1991-1998 5.3 5.6 1.1 2.4 
Turkey 1994-1996 14.8 94.8 -0.8 -0.2 
United Kingdom 1991-1994 4.8 7.1 0.4 0.7 
United States 1990-1994 2.4 5.1 1.1 2.1 
 
 
Determinants of sacrifice ratio 
In this section we empirically investigate the effect of transparency and independence of 
central banks on sacrifice ratios. In addition to transparency and independence related 
variables we also consider other determinants of sacrifice ratio mentioned in the literature 
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such as initial inflation, speed of disinflation, length of disinflation episodes and openness 
of the economy. 
Ball (1994) found that initial inflation levels have weak negative effects on sacrifice 
ratios. Zhang (2005) reported a negative and significant relationship between log of initial 
inflation and sacrifice ratios. We find that the log of initial inflation almost in all of our 
regressions have a negative and statistically significant effect on sacrifice ratios, in line 
with Zhang’s (2005) conclusion that the relationship between initial inflation and sacrifice 
ratio seems to be non-linear.1 However, when the log of initial inflation is included in the 
regressions along with transparency and independence indexes, there is no significant 
effect on either of the sacrifice ratios (output gap or unemployment), although the 
coefficients remain negative. The correlation coefficient between log of initial inflation and 
transparency index is -0.64, which could explain why as soon as we add transparency index 
into the equation log of initial inflation loses its significance. 
Speed of disinflation is another determinant of sacrifice ratios. We follow Ball 
(1994) and calculate the speed of disinflation as the total change from peak to trough over 
the length of the disinflation episode. When we regress sacrifice ratios only on speed of 
disinflation, it has a negative and significant coefficient. However, when we regress 
sacrifice ratio on speed of disinflation as well as log of initial inflation the coefficient for 
speed of inflation changes sign but remain significant, while the coefficient of log of 
inflation remain negative and maintain its significance. This could be due to 
multicollinearity between speed of inflation and log of initial inflation (correlation 
coefficient is 0.74). As a result, we only include the log of initial inflation in our 
regressions. 
We also considered change in inflation (from peak to trough) during disinflation 
period and length of disinflation period as explanatory variables. When we regress the 
sacrifice ratio on log of initial inflation and change in inflation, they both have significant 
coefficients with negative and positive signs respectively. When we add the transparency 
index, the coefficient is no longer significant. The length of disinflation period was not 
significant in any cases.  
Following Ball (1994), we consider openness of the economy as an explanatory 
variable. The idea is that in a more open economy when there is a monetary contraction, 
exchange rate appreciation has a larger effect on the price level. Therefore, inflation falls 
more and sacrifice ratio becomes smaller. For both sacrifice ratios that we calculated the 
coefficients of openness are negative but not statistically significant. We therefore did not 
include this variable in the final regressions. 
Table 2 reports our empirical results about sacrifice ratio (output gap) and its 
determinants. We use the same institutional measures used by Stasavage (2003). Columns 
(1), (2) and (3) show the results of regressing sacrifice ratio on each of forecast 
transparency, override possibility and report to legislature, respectively, as well as log of 
initial inflation and a constant. In Column (4) we regress sacrifice ratio on forecast 
transparency, override possibility, report to legislature, log of initial inflation and a 
constant. In all four columns coefficients of log of initial inflation have negative signs and 
statistically significant.  
                                                 
1 We also tried linear, quadratic and cubic form but log of initial inflation had the best fit. 
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Table 2- Sacrifice Ratio (Output Gap) and Stasavage (2003) institutional measures 
 Dependent Variable: Sacrifice Ratio (Output gap) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Forecast transparency -0.171 
(0.108) 
  -0.133 
(0.132) 
























N 31 31 31 31 
R2 0.116 0.157 0.073 0.182 
1- Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively. 
2- The number of observations dropped to 31 as (Stasavage, 2003) institutional measures only cover 31 countries 
out of the 40 countries included in the study. 
Forecast transparency’s coefficients in both column (1) and (4) have a negative sign as 
expected but are not statistically significant. Override possibility has a negative sign and is 
significant in 10% level in column (2) but when it is included along with other variables it 
is no longer significant but it maintains its negative sign. Report to Legislature in column 
(3) and (4) has positive signs, but is not statistically significant. Stasavage’s (2003) results 
show that forecast transparency has a negative and significant effect on sacrifice ratios but 
his results did not provide strong evidence about the significance of override possibility 
and report to legislature on sacrifice ratios.  
 
Table 3- Sacrifice Ratio (Output Gap) and Transparency and Independence Indices 
 Dependent Variable: Sacrifice Ratio (Output gap) 

















Log of initial 
inflation 




















N 40 37 40 40 37 37 
R2 0.122 0.029 0.100 0.136 0.117 0.144 
1- Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. 
2- Independence index for three countries (Brazil, Denmark and Switzerland) are missing that is why N reduces to 37 
whenever Independence Index is included.   
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We now replace Stasavage (2003)’s institutional measures with the transparency index 
and independence index estimated by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). Table 3 shows these 
results. The transparency index in column (1) is significant but has the wrong sign. In 
columns (4) and (6) when we include the transparency index along with other variables it 
remains statistically significant but still has the wrong sign. We expect to see negative sign 
for transparency index indicating that the more transparent central banks face lower 
sacrifice ratios. The independence index is not significant in any of the regressions. Again, 
the limited number of countries for which we have data, combined with the high correlation 
(-0.64) between the log of initial inflation and the transparency index, might be the reason 
why the coefficient for log of initial inflation loses its significant when transparency index 
is included.  
Table 4 shows the results of regressions using the unemployment based sacrifice 
ratios and Stasavage (2003) institutional measures. The only significant explanatory 
variable in all the regressions is log of initial inflation. The coefficients for forecast 
transparency, override possibility and report to legislature have negative signs in column 
(1)-(3) but they are not significant. Report to Legislature in column (4) is still not 
significant but it changes sign. 
Table 4- Sacrifice Ratio (unemployment) and Stasavage (2003) institutional measures 
 Dependent Variable: Sacrifice Ratio (Unemployment) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Forecast transparency -0.299 
(0.252) 
  -0.228 
(0.308) 
























N 31 31 31 31 
R2 0.111 0.117 0.084 0.131 
1- Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively. 
2- The number of observations dropped to 31 as (Stasavage, 2003) institutional measures only cover 31 countries 
out of the 40 countries included in my study. 
Table 5 shows our results when we replace Stasavage (2003)’s institutional measures 
with the transparency and independence indices. While the transparency index is 
significant in column (1), (4) and (6) its coefficients still have positive signs. The 
independence index in column (2) is significant but when other explanatory variables add 
to the regression it is no longer significant although it keeps its positive sign. Its positive 
sign seems to be in line with Debelle & Fischer (1995)’s conclusion that if central banks 
are not held accountable for their actions, they might become too conservative and 
disregard the short-term trade-off between inflation and output. Coefficients of log of initial 
inflation in column (3) and (5) are negative and significant. In column (6) when all other 
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explanatory variables are also included, it is no longer significant but still has a negative 
sign. 
 
Table 5- Sacrifice Ratio (Unemployment) and Transparency and Independence 
Indices 
 Dependent Variable: Sacrifice Ratio (Unemployment) 

















 Log of initial 
inflation 




















 N 39 36 39 39 36 36 
 R2 0.147 0.080 0.097 0.153 0.150 0.192 
1- Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. 
2- We could not find unemployment rate for Slovenia in 1989. Therefore, we could not calculate sacrifice ratio for 
Slovenia. That is why N drops to 39. In addition, Independence index for three countries (Brazil, Denmark and 
Switzerland) are missing that is why N reduces to 36 whenever Independence Index is included.   
Conclusion 
This paper studies the effect of central banks transparency and accountability levels on the 
cost of disinflation. To capture the cost of disinflation we followed Ball (1994) and Zhang 
(2005) to calculate sacrifice ratios based on output gap and unemployment, respectively. 
We then use forecast transparency, override possibility and report to legislature data 
provided by Stasavage (2003) to investigate whether they affected the cost of disinflation 
for 40 OECD countries during 1990s. our results show no evidence that central banks with 
more transparent forecasts, or more override possibility from the government, or the ones 
that have to report to legislature face lower sacrifice ratio.  
However, when we use more comprehensive estimates for transparency index it 
seems that more transparent central banks face higher disinflation costs. It might be 
because the more transparent central banks have a lower initial inflation rate to begin with. 
Therefore, reducing the inflation rate further is very costly for them compared to countries 
that begin with double digit inflation rates. We find no evidence that there is significant 











Alesina, A., Summers, L. (1993). Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic 
Performance: Some Comparative Evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
25(2), 151-162. 
Anderson, P., Wascher, W. (1999). Sacrifice Ratios and Conduct of Monetary Policy in 
Conditions of Low inflation. Bank of International Settlements Working Paper , No. 
82. 
Ball, L. (1994). What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? In N. G. Mankiw (Ed.), Monetary 
Policy . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 155-182. 
Chortareas, G., Stasavage, D., & Sterne, G. (2002). Does It Pay to be Transparent? 
International Evidence from Central Bank Forecasts. Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Review , 84 (4), 99-117. 
Chortareas, G., Stasavage, D., & Sterne, G. (2003). Does Monetary Policy Transparency 
Reduce Disinflation Costs? The Manchester School, 71 (5), 521-40. 
Cukierman, A., Webb, S., & Neypati, B. (1992). Measuring the Independence of Central 
Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes. World Bank Economic Review, 6 (1), 353-
98. 
Debelle, G., & Fischer, S. (1995). How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? In J. Fuhrer 
(Ed.), Goals, Guidelines and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers (pp. 195-
221). Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series No. 38. 
Dincer, N., & Eichengreen, B. (2014). Central Bank Transparency and Independence: 
Updates and New Measures. International Journal of Central Banking , 189-253. 
Eijffinger, S., & Geraats, P. (2006). How Transparent are Central Banks? European 
Journal of Political Economy 22, 1-22. 
Fry, M., Julius, D., Mahadeva, L., Roger, S., & Sterne, G. (2000). Key Issues in the Choice 
of a Monetary Policy Framework. In L. Mahadeva and G. Sterne (Eds.),  Monetary 
Policy Frameworks in a Global Context. London: Routledge, pp.1-18. 
Gordon, R., & King, S. (1982). The Output Cost of Disinflation in Traditional and Vector 
Autoregressive Models. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 205-242. 
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., & Tabellini, G. (1991). Political and Monetary Institutions and 
Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries. Economic Policy , 6 (13), 341-
392. 
Hofstetter, M. (2008). Disinflation in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Free Lunch? 
Journal of Macroeconomics , 30 (1), 327-345. 
Okun, A. Efficient Disinflation Policies. American Economic Review , 68, 348-352. 
Stasavage, D. (2003). Transparency, Democratic Accountability, and the Economic 
Consequences of Monetary Institutions. American Journal of Political Science , 47(3), 
389-402. 
Zhang, L. (2005). Sacrifice Ratios with Long-Lived Effects. International Finance, 8 (2), 
231-262. 
 
